This paper studies a repeated minority game with public signals, symmetric bounded recall, and pure strategies. We investigate both public and private equilibria of the game with fixed recall size. We first show how public equilibria in such a repeated game can be represented as colored subgraphs of a de Bruijn graph. Then we prove that the set of public equilibrium payoffs with bounded recall converges to the set of uniform equilibrium payoffs as the size of the recall increases. We also show that private equilibria behave badly: A private equilibrium payoff with bounded recall need not be a uniform equilibrium payoff.
1. Introduction. Repeated games with complete information are known to have multiple equilibria. The prominent result in this direction is the folk theorem that asserts that in games with perfect monitoring and perfectly rational players, every feasible and individually rational payoff can be sustained by an equilibrium of the repeated game. A more realistic model to study involves games with imperfect monitoring, where players imperfectly observe other players' actions, and bounded rationality, where players have limited information processing abilities.
The literature on games with imperfect monitoring seeks to characterize the set of equilibrium payoffs (see, e.g., Lehrer [21, 22] , Abreu et al. [2] , Fudenberg and Levine [14] , Tomala [36] , Renault and Tomala [29] ), and the literature on games with bounded rationality examines whether equilibrium payoffs of the unrestricted repeated game can be approximated by equilibrium payoffs of the repeated game with bounded rationality (see, e.g., Rubinstein [33] , Abreu and Rubinstein [1] , Kalai and Stanford [18] , Lehrer [20, 23] , Ben-Porath [6, 7] , Sabourian [34] , Neyman [27] , Gossner and Hernández [16, 17] , Bavly and Neyman [5] ). Typically, these two problems have been studied separately in the literature. A notable exception is a recent paper by Cole and Kocherlakota [11] , where a parametric class of repeated games with imperfect monitoring is examined. These authors study the set of perfect public equilibrium payoffs, which are sustained by strongly symmetric strategies with recall K-that is, equilibrium payoffs of the infinitely repeated games obtained by finite recall strategies. They show that, for some specifications of the parameters, for large K this set of equilibrium is equal to the whole set of equilibrium payoffs.
The present paper also aims at blending these two approaches by considering equilibria of the repeated game where each player is restricted to finite recall strategies. Because the problem is quite difficult when dealt with in its generality, as a first step in this direction, we analyze a minority game. In this class of games each player has two actions and aims at choosing the action that is less popular among all players. The game is repeated, and after each stage the most popular (or equivalently the less popular) action is publicly announced.
Attention to phenomena where it is advantageous to be in the minority is present in some papers by Arthur [3, 4] . Motivated by his ideas, a whole literature developed, especially in journals of theoretical physics. The reader is referred to the recent books by Challet et al. [10] and Coolen [12] for a history of the problem, its statistical-mechanics analysis, and some applications to financial markets.
If the analysis of minority games started considering situations involving a huge number of players, some models with a small number of players capture interesting phenomena and require a strategic analysis. For instance, consider the case where each of three agents can satisfactorily carry out a procedure only if a minimal throughput is obtained via a communication link. They can choose one of two links, and the minimal throughput is guaranteed only if one of the agents uses that link alone. This is often the case when downloading data in peer-to-peer (P2P) systems (see, e.g., Suri et al. [35] ).
Renault et al. [30] are the first to consider a minority game from a strategic viewpoint. They prove an undiscounted folk theorem for this game. In particular, they construct a uniform equilibrium where the payoff of each player is zero. It is interesting to notice that a folk theorem exists for this game even if no identifiability condition à la Fudenberg et al. [15] holds. Discounted and finitely repeated versions of the minority game are studied by Renault et al. [31] .
In the present paper, a three-player minority game with imperfect public monitoring and bounded recall is studied, and only pure strategies are considered. Bounded recall and public signal are typical assumptions for minority games in the physics literature. We first analyze public equilibria. Public strategy profile in those games can be represented as the choice of a subgraph in a de Bruijn graph, together with a coloring of the vertices, i.e., a rule that assigns each vertex to a player. Using these tools, we compute some equilibria. Other authors have used de Bruijn graphs and sequences to model behaviors with bounded recall: See, e.g., Challet and Marsili [9] , Piccione and Rubinstein [28] , Gossner and Hernández [16, 17] , and Liaw and Liu [25] .
We look, then, at the asymptotic behavior of the set of bounded-recall equilibrium payoffs. For any game with bounded recall and imperfect public monitoring, the set of public equilibria with bounded recall is a subset of the set of public equilibria with unbounded recall, and the set of public-equilibrium payoffs increases with the size of the recall. However, for some games it may not converge to the set of unbounded-recall publicequilibrium payoffs. For instance, consider a repeated game with a public blank signal. Because players have no information, the set of unbounded-recall equilibrium payoffs is the convex hull of stage-Nash payoffs. In the game with bounded recall and public strategies, the public memory is always empty, so players always choose the same action and bounded-recall public equilibria are nothing but stage-Nash equilibria. Other examples of games where convergence fails, even under perfect monitoring, can be found in a earlier version of this paper (Renault et al. [32] ).
For the minority game, we show that the set of public-equilibrium payoffs does converge to the set of unbounded-recall public-equilibrium payoffs as the length of recall increases.
The set of private equilibria lacks the nice properties of public equilibria, and we exhibit a private equilibrium with recall 3 whose payoff does not lie in the set of unbounded-recall private-equilibrium payoffs. These results are somehow connected to Mailath et al. [26] and Kandori and Obara [19] , who also compare public and private equilibria, but, to the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first that considers such a comparison in a bounded-recall framework.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes a model of repeated games with imperfect public monitoring and bounded recall. Section 3 gives the main results for public equilibria. Section 4 deals with private equilibria.
2. Repeated games with public signals.
Description of the model. Consider a stage game
In this setting N is a set of players, for each i ∈ N ; A i is the set of actions available to player i; A = ×i∈N A i is the set of action profiles; and the map g i A → is the payoff function for player i. Denote by g A → N the vector payoff function g i i∈N . For every i ∈ N , put A −i = ×j∈N j =i A j ; therefore, a −i ∈ A −i will be a shortcut for a j j = i ∈ ×j∈N j =i A j . Consider, then, a set of signals U and a mapping A → U . In the whole paper the sets N , A i , and U are assumed to be nonempty and finite. This game is repeated over time. At each round t = 1 2 players choose actions, and if a t ∈ A is the action profile at stage t, they observe a public signal u t = a t before proceeding to the next stage. The set of histories of length t ≥ 0 for player i is
0 being a singleton, and i = t≥0 i t is the set of all histories for player i.
When U = A and is the identity mapping on A, each player fully observes the action profile. When the function is constant, no player receives information on the action profile. These two cases will be referred to as perfect monitoring and trivial monitoring, respectively.
A strategy for player i is a mapping generates a unique history a t u t t≥1 ∈ A × U , where for each t, u t = a t . In the whole paper only pure strategies are considered.
Given a strategy profile , the average payoff for player i up to time T is
In other words, a public strategy depends only on public signals. The set of public strategies of player i is denoted by i . A strategy profile is a public equilibrium if it is a uniform equilibrium and each player's strategy is public. The corresponding set of equilibrium payoffs is denoted by E . In the case of perfect monitoring, any strategy is public, because the public history contains all the past.
In repeated games with unbounded recall, every pure strategy is equivalent to a public strategy. Knowing her own strategy and the history of public signals, a player can deduce the actions she played in the past (see, e.g., Tomala [36] ). More precisely, for every i ∈ i , there exists i ∈ i such that for all −i ∈ −i and for each stage t, a t i −i = a t i −i . An immediate corollary of this is that E = E . To emphasize the dependence on the player's own past actions, a strategy that is not public will be called private. As will be seen in the sequel, in games with bounded recall, considering public or private strategies makes a big difference.
Bounded recall.
Consider now players who recall only recent observations. Informally, a strategy has recall k if the player who uses it remembers only what happened on the k previous stages, and plays in a stationary way, i.e., this player has no clock and relies on her recall, but not on time. The formal definition is the following. Definition 2.3. Given an integer k ∈ , the strategy i ∈ i has recall k if there exists a mapping f A i × U k → A i such that for all t ≥ k and for all histories h = a
a i t u t By convention, a strategy that has recall 0 is a constant mapping on i . Lehrer [20] and Bavly and Neyman [5] use a somewhat different definition: In those papers, a boundedrecall strategy is the choice of an initial recall plus the mapping f . This implies that whenever the initial recall reappears during the course of the game, the player will play in the same way as at early stages. In the definition given here, a player plays as she wishes before stage k and then uses the stationary rule f . We believe that asymptotic results are unlikely to differ using one or another definition, however, for small values of k, the initialization phase might be critical. Also, note that Sabourian [34] uses the same definition as the one given above.
The set of strategies for player i that have recall k is denoted by i k and k = ×i∈N i k . Because the game is finite, for each ∈ k , the sequence a t is eventually periodic, i.e., periodic from some stage on, which implies the existence of be the public-strategy game with recall k, and E k be the set of its (pure) Nash equilibrium payoffs.
Remark 2.1. In games with bounded recall, considering public strategies is a true restriction. As mentioned before, every pure strategy i is equivalent to a public strategy i , but the bounded-recall property is not preserved. It might be that i has recall k but i does not. For example, consider trivial monitoring (the mapping is constant). Given any recall k, there is only one history of public signals; thus, a public strategy with bounded recall is a constant strategy. By contrast, a private strategy (of recall 1) can simply alternate between two actions. The equivalent public strategy alternates between the two actions according to time and thus is not a public strategy with bounded recall according to Definition 2.3.
Remark 2.2. In the game with recall 0, strategies are constant and thus E 0 = E 0 . This set further coincides with the set of pure Nash equilibrium payoffs of the stage game. Remark 2.3. All the equilibrium notions defined in this section might well be empty because we are dealing with pure strategies. However, when the stage game has a pure Nash equilibrium, playing this equilibrium at each stage regardless of history is an equilibrium of the repeated game in any sense defined above: uniform, k-recall public, k-recall private. The rest of the paper deals mainly with the minority game, which has pure Nash equilibria.
The following general lemma will be used in the sequel.
Lemma 2.1. (a) If a strategy profile is an equilibrium of k , then is a uniform equilibrium of . Thus,
(b) If a strategy profile is an equilibrium of k , then is an equilibrium of k . Thus, E k ⊂ E k .
(c) If a strategy profile is an equilibrium of k , then is an equilibrium of k+1 . Thus, E k ⊂ E k+1 .
Proof. (a) This kind of result is common in the literature on games with bounded complexity (see, e.g., Neyman [27] , Ben-Porath [7] , Lehrer [20, 23] ) and relies on a usual dynamic programming argument. Let be an equilibrium of k . For each player i, finding a best reply in i to −i amounts to solving a dynamic programming problem, where the state space is U k , the set of public histories of length k; the action space is A i , the payoff in state h = u 1 u k given action a i is g i a i −i h ; and the new state is u 2 u k a i −i h . It is well known (see Blackwell [8] ) that there exists a stationary optimal strategy. Thus, the best reply of player i to a profile of public strategies with recall k is a public strategy with recall k (see Abreu and Rubinstein [1, Lemma 1] ). Therefore, is a uniform equilibrium of .
(b) This follows directly from the previous point. The game k is a subgame of k in the sense that the set of strategies of each player in k is a subset of the set of strategies of this player in k . Then let be a strategy profile in k if is not an equilibrium of k , then a player i has a profitable deviation in i k ⊂ i ; thus, is not a uniform equilibrium, contradicting the previous point.
(c) The argument is similar to the one used for point (b), k is a subgame of k+1 : Any strategy with recall k can be played in the game with recall k + 1. Therefore, if a strategy profile in k is not an equilibrium of k+1 , then some player i has a profitable deviation in i k+1 ⊂ i ; thus, is not a uniform equilibrium contradicting point (a).
2.4.
The repeated minority game. In the minority game (MG) three players have to choose, simultaneously, one of two rooms: L (left) or R (right). For each profile of action a = a 1 a 2 a 3 ∈ L R 3 , call minority room the less crowded room and majority room the more crowed room. Player i's payoff is then one if she chooses the minority room and zero otherwise. Hence, the payoff matrix of the MG is as follows, where player 1 chooses the row, player 2 the column, and player 3 the matrix.
The profile where one player chooses L and the two other players choose R is a Nash equilibrium. All pure Nash equilibria of this game are obtained by permutation of players and rooms. Denote by C the convex hull of payoff vectors generated by these equilibria. If e i ∈ 3 is the vector whose ith component is one and the other components are zero, then
It is worth noticing that this is also the set of Pareto-efficient payoffs in the game. Consider now the repeated game where the majority room is publicly observed. At each stage t = 1 2 , players choose their room, and before stage t + 1, the majority room is publicly announced: U = L R , and
The rest of the paper deals with the repeated minority game with these public signals. The following folktheoremlike result holds. Proposition 2.1. In the minority game, E = C.
Proof. This follows directly from the characterization given in Tomala [36, Theorem 5.1, p. 104], but we provide a simple direct proof. First note that because C is the convex hull of Nash equilibrium payoffs of the one-shot game, then C ⊂ E . Given any point x in C, one can find a sequence of Nash equilibria a t t of the minority game, such that the average payoff vector along this sequence converges to x. Then, the strategy profile such that for each player i and stage t, player i plays a i t at stage t irrespective of the history, is clearly a uniform equilibrium with payoff x.
To get the converse inclusion, note that there are two types of action profiles: Either two players are in the same room and the profile is an equilibrium of the MG, or the three players are in the same room. In the latter case, each player has a profitable deviation (she prefers to switch rooms), and further, this deviation does not change the majority room, i.e., the public signal. If at a strategy profile the three players are in the same room on a nonnegligible set of stages, then player 1 can switch rooms at these stages. This increases her payoff at these stages without affecting public signals, hence, without affecting the behavior of the other players. Such a strategy profile cannot be a uniform equilibrium, and therefore E ⊂ C.
Main results.
3.1. Public equilibria and de Bruijn graphs. Here we give a combinatorial representation of k-recall strategies using de Bruijn graphs. We consider a directed graph T k , where each of the 2 k nodes is labeled by a k-letter word written with the alphabet L R .
The word y succeeds x whenever x precedes y. Hence, each node (i.e., the word associated with it) precedes only two nodes. Such a graph is called a de Bruijn graph (see, e.g., de Bruijn [13] and Yoeli [37] for some properties of these graphs). The following figure ( Figure 1 ) shows a de Bruijn graph T 3 based on sequences written with the alphabet L R .
A proof of the following result can be found in Yoeli [37] (see Lempel [24] for a generalization to any finite alphabet). The link with public strategies is the following. Let = 1 2 3 be a k-recall strategy profile, a t t the induced sequence of action profiles, and u t t the induced sequence of public signals. We denote by
The mapping f associates with every public memory x ∈ L R k the next action profile. From stage k on, the play of the game is perfectly determined by f -that is, f x t−1 = a t for each t > k.
The sequence x t t is eventually periodic: There exist two integers t 0 and p such that x t+p = x t , ∀ t ≥ t 0 . The payoff associated with is thus the average payoff over a period:
Let us call a cycle of a tuple x t+1 x t+p with t ≥ t 0 . Lemma 3.1. If is a public equilibrium of k , then for each x in the cycle of , f x is a Nash equilibrium of the one-shot game.
Proof. Otherwise, there is an x in the cycle of such that f x = L L L (or = R R R ). Then player 1 deviates and plays R (or L) whenever the public memory is x, and plays like 1 otherwise. This deviation does not affect the sequence of public signals, and thus does not affect the behavior of other players. It is profitable because at least once every p stages, the player collects a payoff of one instead of zero.
Thanks to this lemma, we can restrict our attention to mappings f that map public memories (i.e., L R k ) to Nash equilibria of the one-shot game. Notice now that a Nash equilibrium of the minority game is fully described by (i) the player who gets 1 and (ii) the majority room. That is, to specify the mapping f , we must attach to each public memory (i) a winning player and (ii) the next public signal. We can thus describe a strategy profile in the de Bruijn graphs by selecting one outgoing edge for each node and by coloring the nodes: Each node is assigned to a player, or to nobody if the players are all in the same room. As we said before, in equilibrium every node is assigned to a player.
Note that a node is assigned to player i when she is the winning player. Therefore, if she changes action at this node, first, she gets a bad payoff, and second, she does not change the public signal. A deviation of player i can thus be regarded as an alternative choice of an outgoing edge at each node that is not assigned to her.
To sum up, a public equilibrium in the k-recall game can be described as follows: for each node of T k , one outgoing edge and one player are chosen in such a way that no player i can induce a more profitable cycle in the graph by changing outgoing edges at nodes not assigned to her. 3.2. Some public equilibria. We now describe some public-equilibrium payoffs.
The following notation and terminology will be used in the sequel.
Call word any finite sequence of signals. Given two words u = u 1 u p and v = v 1 v q , denote by uv the concatenated word uv = u 1 u p v 1 v q . Consider the minority game with recall k, and its associated de Bruijn graph T k . Call m-cycle a cycle of length m, and call stable the cycles where all the nodes have the same number of Ls. Among the stable cycles having s Ls, say, call main all the cycles containing the nodes L s R k−s or R k−s L s . In T k there are k − 1 main k-cycles and 2 main 1-cycles.
Proof of Lemma 3.2. (a) Consider the k +1 -cycle that contains R k and all the nodes whose label contains just one L. In equilibrium, players cycle on this k + 1 -cycle, and elsewhere they go to this cycle as fast as possible, i.e., through a shortest path in the graph.
Assign node R k to player 2 and all the other nodes in the graph to player 1. Player 1 can deviate only on R k , and she has no incentive to do it, because that would induce a cycle on the node R k that is assigned to player 2. Player 2 can deviate anywhere else, but she has no incentive to do it, because she cannot find a cycle that contains R k and is shorter than the equilibrium cycle. Player 3 can always deviate, but because she would get a zero payoff anyway, she has no incentive to deviate. Figure 2 shows the above equilibrium for k = 3. (b) For every s ∈ 1 k assign nodes R k−s L s to player 2, nodes L k−s R s to player 3, and the other nodes to player 1. In equilibrium players cycle on the main k-cycles, and elsewhere they move to the closest main cycle.
Assume, for instance, that we start with the memory L k . The closest main k-cycle is the cycle of nodes that contain only one R, i.e., the cycle Remark that all nodes are assigned to player 1 except L k−1 R and RL k−1 . Assume that player 1 deviates at node L k−1 R. The next node is L k−2 R 2 , which is not assigned to her. If she deviates again, the next node is still not assigned to her, and so on. Thus, her only possibility to collect payoffs is to stop deviating and follow the equilibrium. Indeed, when player 1 is at a node not assigned to her, under the equilibrium strategy she will be winning at the next k − 2 nodes, whereas if she deviates she will spend more time in nodes where she gets zero.
More generally, consider a node where player 1 could possibly deviate, namely, the nodes assigned either to player 2 or to player 3. One can check that, (i) any deviation in a node not assigned to player 1 leads to another node not assigned to player 1; (ii) the shortest path from a node not assigned to player 1 to the closest node assigned to player 1 is via an equilibrium path, the shortest path from that latter node to the closest node assigned to player 1 is via an equilibrium path, and so on.
Therefore, any nonequilibrium cycle that is forced by player 1 with a finite sequence of deviations is longer than k, and the proportion of nodes in this cycle assigned to player 1 cannot be larger than k − 2 /k. Thus, there is no finite sequence of deviations that would make player 1 better off.
For instance, if k = 3 (see Figure 3) , deviating in LLL (respectively, RRR) would force the 1-cycle LLL (respectively, RRR ). Deviating in LLR (respectively, RRL) would increase the distance to the next 1-node from one to at least three, hence the deviation would be profitable only if it induced a 5-cycle with two nodes assigned to player 1, but this is not possible because player 1 cannot deviate on her own nodes. Deviating in RLL (respectively LRR) would increase the distance to the next 1-node from two to at least three. Using the same argument as before, we can see that this deviation is not profitable.
The argument is similar for the other players. Consider now a node where player 2 could possibly deviate, namely, the nodes assigned either to player 1 or to player 3. It is not difficult to verify that (i) any deviation in a node not assigned to player 2 leads to another node not assigned to player 2, (ii) the shortest path from a node not assigned to player 2 to the closest node assigned to player 2 is via an equilibrium path, the shortest path from that node to the closest node assigned to player 2 is via an equilibrium path, and so on.
Therefore any nonequilibrium cycle that is forced by player 2 with a finite sequence of deviations is longer than k, and the proportion of nodes in this cycle assigned to player 2 cannot be larger than 1/k.
By symmetry, the argument for player 3 is the same. (c) As above just assign to player 2 the nodes that were assigned to player 3, and repeat the argument. For the case k = 3, see Figure 4 . Remark 3.1. Define the effective recall of a strategy as the smallest k for which this strategy has recall k. In our equilibrium constructions, the effective recalls of the three players are different. For instance, when k = 3, in the equilibrium of Lemma 3.2(a) the effective recalls of the three players are zero, zero, and three, respectively. In fact, player 1 always plays L, player 2 always plays R. In (b) the recalls are 1, 3, and 3, and in (c) they are 1, 2, and 3. An open question is whether in the game with recall k there exists an equilibrium payoff such that in every equilibrium yielding this payoff, each player has effective recall k (this question was raised by an anonymous referee).
The partial results of Lemma 3.2 enable us to completely describe the set of public-equilibrium payoffs for small values of k. .
Note that for k ≤ 2, all public-equilibrium payoffs are on the boundary of the triangle C. A direct consequence of Lemma 3.2 is that 0 and its permutations. We show now that none of these payoffs can be obtained in equilibrium.
First we prove that ∈ E 2 . In fact, the maximal length of a cycle in the de Bruijn graph T 2 is four. Hence, in order to obtain such a payoff in equilibrium, the players would have to cycle on a 3-cycle of T 2 , and each node should be assigned to a different player. There are only two such cycles. Take, for instance, the cycle LL → LR → RL, and assume that these nodes are assigned to players 1, 2, and 3, respectively. Then player 2 deviating in RL induces the cycle LR → RL → LR and gets a payoff of 1 2 . An analogous argument can be used for the cycle LR → RR → RL. We claim now that the payoff is an equilibrium:
• 1 1 2 3 is not an equilibrium, because player 3 would deviate in LR;
• 1 2 1 3 is not an equilibrium, because player 3 would deviate in LR, and player 2 would deviate in RL;
• 2 1 3 1 is not an equilibrium, because player 2 would deviate in LR, and player 3 would deviate in RL. All other possible cases are obtained by permuting rooms and players.
The above cycle cannot give the payoff 3 4 1 4 0 or its permutations, either. Using the same notation as before, • 1 1 1 2 is not an equilibrium, because player 2 would deviate in LR, • 1 1 2 1 is not an equilibrium, because player 2 would deviate in RL. As before, the other possible cases are obtained by permuting rooms and players.
3.3. Convergence ofÊ k . We use the standard notion of Hausdorff convergence of closed sets and get the following convergence result.
Theorem 3.1. In the minority game lim k→+ E k = E = C; that is, for every > 0, there exists k 0 such that for each x in C and each k ≥ k 0 , there exists y ∈ E k such that x − y ≤ .
Proof of Theorem 3.1. Let m ≥ 2 be an integer and let C m be the set of vectors of x ∈ C with rational components of the form x i = m i /m with m i ≥ 2 integers. The C m s are nonempty for m ≥ 6. Although this sequence of sets is not increasing for inclusion, it is clear that C m converges to C as m goes to infinity, i.e., sup x∈C inf y∈C m x − y goes to zero as m goes to infinity. Therefore, Theorem 3.1 follows from Lemma 2.1(c) and from Lemma 3.3 below.
Lemma 3.3. For every integer m ≥ 2 and K
Remark 3.2. This lemma shows that the whole payoff set is covered up to errors of order 1/m by finite recall equilibrium payoffs with k = O m 2 , so that given m, a polynomial capacity of recall is sufficient. We thank a referee for this observation.
The strategy construction is in a folk-theorem spirit. First the right payoff is obtained by playing an adapted main path. In case of a detected deviation, punishments have to be performed. Because of finite recall, the evidence that a deviation occurred may disappear from the recall. To get a deviating player to be punished forever, players are asked to periodically rewrite a word in the public recall, indicating that a deviation has occurred and which actions should be used to punish. This construction relies heavily on properties of the minority game and the majority room as a signal. The following properties will be used extensively.
• A player who is in the minority room at some stage cannot change the signal at that stage. This implies that a player who gets a payoff of one at a given stage has no incentive to deviate at that stage because it can only decrease the stage payoff and has no impact whatsoever on the future.
• The main path is constructed so that at each stage a Nash equilibrium of the one-shot game is played. Thus, at each stage there is one player in the minority room and the other two players are in the majority room, both receiving a payoff of zero. If the signal changes, that means that one of the two players in the majority room deviated, but the public signal does not tell who did. A simple way to punish the deviating player without knowing her identity is to apply the following policy: "If I see a wrong signal at stage t, then I remain in the room where I was at stage t." This insures that the deviating player, who was in the majority room when the deviation was detected, remains in the majority room as long as the punishment phase lasts.
• Two players can write any word in the public recall, whatever the behavior of the third player is.
• Each payoff vector of the one-shot game is obtained by exactly two actions profiles. These two profiles yield different public signals because they can be deduced from each other by permuting rooms.
The following terminology will be used in the proof of Lemma 3. (ii) the public history a * 1 a * m associated with H is L m . Such a sequence exists: It suffices to play a sequence of Nash equilibria of the MG such that player i gains one exactly m i times, and the majority room is always L. For each room r ∈ L R , letr be the other room, and if a is an action profile, letā be the action profile where every player has switched rooms. Let H ∈ A m be the sequence obtained from H by switching rooms:
The main path will be the periodic repetition of the sequence H H. Here is how to construct a profile of strategies of recall k that generates this periodic sequence of action profiles.
Let W = L m be the word induced by H. A word w is a subword of W if w = L q with 0 ≤ q ≤ m. If a periodic repetition of H H is played, at each stage the public recall ends by a word of the type W w or W w with w subword of W (possibly of length 0). Call such words end words. An end-word writes either
The aim is to play a periodic repetition of H H. To do that, at each stage knowledge of the end word is sufficient to know what action profile should be played at the next stage. Thus, letting E be the set of end words, there exists a mapping f that maps E to pure Nash equilibria of the MG, and such that for each end word e, f e = f i e i∈N is the action profile that follows e in the periodic repetition of H H. Now consider deviations. After each end word e, f e should be played. On the main path f e induces a winning player i e and a signal r e . Ifr e is observed, then some player j = i e has deviated. Let us call deviation word a word of the type er e : A deviation word writes either
If a deviation word er e appears in the recall, the strategy prescribes to keep playing f e as long as the position of er e is greater than 2m. During this punishing phase the signal is completely controlled by the punished player; hence, this player could write in the recall another deviation word e r e . To prevent other end words from appearing in the recall, if L m−1 (respectively, R m−1 ) appears, all players must play R (respectively, L). Finally, when the position of er e becomes less than or equal to 2m, the players must rewrite this word in the recall by all playing the same actions for an appropriate number of times.
The exact definition of the strategy profile is given now.
• Initialization. At the first m stages each player plays L. For the next m stages, each player plays R, for the next m stages each player plays L, and so on until stage k.
• Main path. If the recall contains no deviation word and ends by the end word e, each player i plays f i e .
• Early punishments.
-If the recall contains a deviation word er e whose position is greater than 2m, and if the recall does not end by L m−1 or by R m−1 , then each player i plays f i e . -If the recall contains a deviation word er e whose position is greater than 2m, and if the recall ends by L m−1 , then each player i plays R.
-If the recall contains a deviation-word er e whose position is greater than 2m, and if the recall ends by R m−1 , then each player i plays L.
• Late punishments. If the recall contains a deviation word er e = L m R q L with 0 ≤ q < m, let p be its position.
-If m < p ≤ 2m, then each player i plays L.
-If m − q < p ≤ m, then each player i plays R.
-If p = m − q, then each player i plays L. Proceed similarly for er e = R m L q R.
• Other memories. For all other memories, each player plays L. It remains to prove that the above-defined strategy profile has payoff x and is an equilibrium of k . If all players play this strategy, the public recall after stage k is either
, depending on the parity of K. It ends by an end word e and contains no deviation word. The next action profile is then f e and the public recall still ends by an end word, so the strategy uses f again. By construction of f , this strategy profile generates the periodic repetition of H H and the payoff is indeed x.
Suppose that player i deviates. First, player i cannot modify the signals in the initialization phase, and because this phase is transient, it is irrelevant for payoffs. We thus consider deviations at later stages.
If the deviation never changes the signals, then player i changes action only at stages where she was in the minority room. Therefore, she loses payoff at these stages and does not affect the behavior of other players. Such a deviation is thus not profitable.
Suppose now that player i changes the signal at some stage, therefore i is in the majority room at this stage. This generates a deviation word er e . As long as the position of er e is greater than 2m, the other players play f e , so player i receives a payoff of zero unless if she generates words of the type L m−1 or R m−1 . In such cases, the other players will play both R or both L. Such situations appear, at most, every m stages. Therefore, the only opportunities to player i to gain a payoff of one are when other players rewrite the deviations word (at most 2m stages), and once every m stages for k − 2m stages. The average payoff for player i is thus no more than
i ≥ 2/m, and K ≥ 2m. Remark 3.3. Theorem 3.1 easily extends to a (2n + 1)-player minority game (each player has to choose between L and R and receives a payoff of one if she is in the minority room, and zero otherwise). However, the proof relies heavily on the specific properties of the game and signal function. Because convergence of E k to E is not always guaranteed-see the introduction or the earlier version of this paper (Renault et al. [32] )-a challenging and open problem is to characterize lim k E k .
Private equilibria.
The following proposition shows that under bounded recall, the set of private-equilibrium payoffs is strictly larger than the set of public-equilibrium payoffs. Furthermore, private equilibria may not be equilibria of the unbounded-recall-i.e., uniform-equilibria, and we find a private equilibrium payoff for k = 3, which lies outside E . 
In the minority game 3/7 3/7 0 ∈ E 3 , and thus E 3 ⊂ E .
This last point is proved by explicitly constructing an equilibrium = 1 2 3 of 3 with payoff 3/7 3/7 0 . The proof is quite lengthy and involved and seems to indicate that more general results in this direction are quite hard to obtain.
As mentioned in the introduction, Mailath et al. [26] and Kandori and Obara [19] compare the behavior of public and private strategies in games with public signals and unbounded recall. Proposition 4.1 does something of that sort in a bounded-recall framework.
Proof of Proposition 4.1. (a) First remark that with private strategies player i can play a periodic sequence of actions with cycle RLL by using a strategy that relies only on her own actions, and does not regard public signals whatsoever. Therefore, consider the strategy profile obtained by cycling
where the ith row indicates the strategy of the ith player. This is clearly an equilibrium of 2 : It is a repetition of one-stage Nash equilibria so that no player can increase her stage payoff by deviating, and further, because players do not regard public signals, no player can change the future behavior of her opponents. The associated payoff is then is not in E 2 .
(b)
We construct an equilibrium = 1 2 3 of 3 with payoff 3/7 3/7 0 . Given strategies of recall 3, the action played by a player at some stage depends only on her last three actions and on the last three public signals. The last 3 ∧ t actions or signals at time t will be called available. Figure 6 . Actions when the last three signals are LLL.
The profile is defined as follows: (a) If at least one available public signal is R, then recommends to each player to switch rooms, i.e., to play L if she played R at the previous stage, and vice versa.
(b) Assume now that all available public signals are L.
(b1) Regarding the first three stages, as long as the public signal is L, recommends playing as follows:
For example, the symbol R in line P3 means that at stage 2, 3 asks player 3 to play R if the public signal of stage 1 was L. Proof. (a) Assume that is played. The induced play can be represented in Figure 7 . The action of a player in the minority room, if any, is emphasized with a circle. The public signal is L at every stage, the induced play eventually has period 7 (one can see a period from stage 3 to stage 9), and the induced payoff is 3/7 3/7 0 .
(b) This part is a direct consequence of the next three lemmas, where the best reply condition is checked for every player.
3 is a best reply against −3 .
Proof. Let 3 be any strategy of player 3 in Figure 7 . Actions induced by 6. Assume that the sequence of public signals never contains the symbol R. Then the sequence of actions played by players 1 and 2 is the same as in Figure 7 . Therefore, at stages 3, 4, 5, and 6 player 3 is playing L (otherwise, the public signal will be R at some stage). Because 3 has recall 3, it implies that player 3 will play L at every stage t ≥ 3. Because L is at each stage the majority room, 3 3 −3 = 0. Case 2. Assume that at some stage the public signal is R. Consider the first staget where this happens. Up to staget, the actions played by player 1 and 2 correspond to Figure 7 , so at staget it is not possible that both players 1 and 2 play R. Consequently, at staget: either players 1 and 3 play R and player 2 plays L, or players 2 and 3 play R and player 1 plays L. Recall now that 1 and 2 ask players 1 and 2 to change rooms whenever one of the available signals is R.
As long as one of the available public signals is R, players 1 and 2 will exchange rooms at each stage, and because players 1 and 2 are not in the same room, the payoff for player 3 will be zero. Therefore, to get out of this punishment phase, player 3 has to play three consecutive times L to induce three consecutive signals L. As a result, it is possible to assume w.l.o.g. that there exists a stage t where the situation is shown in Figure 8 .
If player 3 plays R at stage t + 3, then at this stage players 1 and 3 play R and player 2 plays L or players 2 and 3 play R and player 1 plays L, and player 3 does not get out of the punishment phase where players 1 and 2 exchange rooms at each stage. Player 3's payoff is zero at each stage.
Therefore, let us assume that player 3 plays L at stage t + 3. However, because 3 has recall 3, player 3 will continue to play L as long as the public signal is L. The situation at the end of stage t + 2 is similar to the situation at the end of stage 7 (left table) or stage 6 (right table) of Figure 8 , and from this stage on player 3 will be in the majority room and (the L room) hence will also have payoff zero. So, 3 3
Lemma 4.3. In 3 , 1 is a best reply against −1 .
Proof. Let 1 be a strategy profile of player 1 in If X Y = L R , then the actions played by player 1 are LLLRLRLL. Because signals are assumed to be L at each stage, the next action of player 1 depends on her available actions only, and one sees that in this word the first appearance of LRL is followed by R and the second is followed by L. This sequence of actions is thus unachievable with recall 3. If X Y = R L , then player 1 plays LLR LLR LLR LLR But then at some stage the public signal will be R, yielding a contradiction. Figure 8 . A possible deviation of player 3. 
If T = R, then player 1 plays the following sequence with period 6: LLRRLR LLRRLR LLRRLR Because player 2 plays a sequence with period 7 and gcd 6 7 = 1, at some stage the signal will be R, yielding a contradiction. Therefore, T = L. Now if U = L, the memory of player 1 at stage 10 is the same as at stage 9. She will thus always play L and get a payoff of zero. If U = R, this is exactly as in the case of Figure 7 , and 
also, in this case 1 1 
Claim. It cannot happen that at some stage both players 1 and 3 play R.
Assume on the contrary that there exists a first staget where both player 1 and player 3 play R. Necessarily, t ≥ 3, and because player 3 plays R att,t cannot be the first stage where the signal is R. Therefore, there exists some staget <t such that the signal at staget is R, and the signal at every stage t,t < t <t, is L.
Because player 3 plays R att, thent ≤t + 3. By definition oft, at staget: the signal is R, either player 1 or player 3 play L, and player 2 plays R. So after staget, players 1 and 3 start to exchange rooms, and this contradicts the fact that both player 1 and player 3 play R att.
Given this claim, two cases and several subcases are possible. Case 1. Assume that eventually the sequence of signals only contains L. There existst with u t 2 −2 = L for all t ≥t.
Then for each stage t ≥t + 3, player 3 will play L (see Figure 6) , and given the definition of f 1 , player 1 will eventually play the following sequence with period 7: LLLRRLR LLLRRLR LLLRRLR Because it was assumed that 2 2 −2 > 3/7, there must exist seven consecutive stages among which player 2 is in the minority room for at least four stages. Because the majority room should be L from some stage on, the sequence played by player 2 depends only on her own actions, and therefore has the period of at most 2 3 = 8. One can then check that the only possibility for player 2 to win at least four times out of seven is to play the periodic sequence RRRLLRL RRRLLRL RRRLLRL so there must exist t ≥t such that the play is:
This sequence of actions of player 2 will be denoted by in the sequel. Subcase 1.a. Assume that all signals are L. Then the situation is as follows.
It must be X = R; otherwise, player 2 only plays L and 2 2 −2 = 0. Therefore, player 2, at stage 4, plays L after RLL. This is not compatible with the sequence . Subcase 1.b. Assume that there exists a last staget where the public signal is R. Because player 1 and player 3 never play R at the same time, two possibilities can occur at staget. Subsubcase 1.b.1. If player 1 plays R at staget, then
a Player 1 and player 3 change rooms after a public signal R,
1 L L L = R, e by assumption, the signal has to be L at every stage ≥t + 1. If X = L, then player 2 will always play L and have a payoff of zero. Therefore, X = R. Then Y = L because of the periodic sequence . However, using again, at staget + 6 player 2 should play R, yielding a contradiction.
Subsubcase 1.b.2. If player 3 plays R at staget, then
It must be that X = R; otherwise, player 2 will always play L aftert. The sequence then gives Y = L, and Z = R. However, by again at staget + 7, player 2 should play R, yielding a contradiction. Case 2. It remains to consider the case with an infinite number of stages where the public signal is R. Take any interval of stages t 1 t 2 , where t 1 < t 2 , u t 1 2 −2 = u t 2 2 −2 = R, and for every t ∈ t 1 + 1 t 2 − 1 , u t 2 −2 = L. To conclude the proof, it is sufficient to show that the average payoff of player 2 at stages t 1 t 2 − 1 is at most 3/7. Assume by contradiction that it is not the case, i.e., assume that the average payoff of player 2 at stages t 1 t 2 − 1 is greater than 3/7. Because player 1 and player 3 never play R at the same stage, at stage t 1 , either players 1 and 2 play R; player 3 plays L; or players 3 and 2 play R, player 1 plays L. In each case, players 1 and 3 are going to exchange rooms at stages t 1 + 1, t 1 + 2, and t 1 + 3, so the payoff of player 2 is zero at each stage t in t 1 t 1 + 1 t 1 + 2 t 1 + 3 . It was assumed that the average payoff of player 2 between stage t 1 and stage t 2 − 1 is greater than 3/7. This implies that t 2 ≥ t 1 + 8. Therefore, the signal at stages t 1 + 1 t 1 + 7 is L. Two cases are possible.
Subcase 2.a. At stage t 1 , player 3 plays L.
By a standard argument X = R (otherwise, player 2 plays only L and gets 0). If Y = L, then, because player 2 has recall 3, Then t 2 = t 1 + 16, and the average payoff of player 2 is 3/16. Therefore, to conclude subcase 2.a., it remains to consider the case when Y = R.
Whatever Z is, we have T = R. Thus, t 2 = t 1 + 9, and the average payoff of player 2 is at most 3/9. Subcase 2.b. At stage t 1 , player 1 plays L. The case Y Z = L R also is not possible, because player 2 would have to play the same action at both stages t 1 + 6 and t 1 + 8.
Assume that Y Z = R L . Then,
Here t 2 = t 1 + 10. The average payoff for player 2 at stages t 1 t 1 + 1 t 2 − 1 is only 3/10. The last case to consider is Y Z = R R .
Necessarily Y = R, and t 2 = t 1 + 10. The average payoff for player 2 is then at most 4/10 (< 3/7).
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